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1 You are best-known as “Mr. 
Interlock.” I would like to know how 
you began to work on interlocks and 
with network methods. 
I was in graduate school at Stony Brook in the 1970s, and I 
was interested in questions around Marxist theory, but I 
had started college as a math major. I had always liked 
numbers, but by the time I got to graduate school I had 
developed this aversion to quantitative sociology, and I 
didn’t want anything to do with it. In my second year of 
graduate school I went to a practice job talk by Beth Mintz, 
who was working at the time with Michael Schwartz. She 
presented a talk on corporate ownership and control. In 
order to empirically address that topic, she began writing 
mathematical models on the board, and drawing circles 
and lines, and she was talking about debates in Marxist 
theory. It had never occurred to me that you could deal 
with interesting theoretical questions and use numbers and 
mathematical models. I was really excited by this. So after 
her talk I went to Michael Schwartz, who had run this big 
project, and I asked him if he was interested in having 
somebody else work on the project, and he got very excit-
ed to have a new student who was interested in it. I 
thought that this question of ownership and control was 
interesting but I didn’t know exactly why it was important, 
I knew it was something a lot of people had argued about. 
But it was never clear for me why these arguments were so 
intense. 
I started to get interested in the question theoretically, and 
then I got interested in interlocks. Companies have boards 
of directors, and if you look at the board of one company 
you see people who also sit on the boards of other com-
panies, so they create ties between the companies. Mi-
chael had worked with Harrison White in the 1960s, and 
he was involved in Harrison’s early work on social net-
works. He was there at the same time Mark Granovetter 
was there.  Mark had developed this idea of weak ties 
versus strong ties, and Michael used this distinction in his 
work on interlocks. My interest grew out these questions, 
rooted in my old interest in Marxist theory, and at the 
same time from my interest in these mathematical models 
and social networks. 
2 Your first book, The American 
Corporate Network, was on the 
evolution of the network of the biggest 
US firms. How did you get from this first 
book to the 1992 book, The Structure of 
Corporate Political Action? 
There was actually a good reason for me to switch my 
approach. When we first started doing these network 
analyses of interlocks, there was a lot of excitement: You 
can draw these really beautiful pictures, and you can show 
that all these firms are connected to one another. It initially 
seemed sufficient on its own just to show that these struc-
tures existed. But after a few years, people started asking a 
question: So what? Does it make any difference that all 
these companies are connected? Are there really any be-
havioral consequences of this? For the first couple of years, 
I just tried to argue my way out of the problem: “Well, you 
can’t observe this kind of thing, we know power when we 
see it!” I even published an article in the Academy of 
Management Review, called “Who Controls Whom?” I 
was arguing that boards of directors, even if they rarely did 
anything, were the primary center of control inside the 
firm, because they had the ability to hire and fire the CEO. 
I made that argument because it was a justification for 
looking at interlocks as centers of power. If directors had 
power inside the firm, then it made sense to talk about 
their power in the economy as a whole. 
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This response worked for a while, but I became increasing-
ly concerned that these critics had a point. I really did need 
to show that there were consequences of these ties. The 
question was how to do it. What I needed was a political 
outcome, because we were arguing that these interlocks 
led to political unity or cohesiveness among the large cor-
porations. How were we going to show that empirically? In 
1982, I was at a sociology meeting in San Francisco, and I 
was talking to one my fellow interlock researchers, Tom 
Koenig. Tom, in his dissertation, had looked at political 
contributions made by corporations. There had been a 
recent law in the United States that allowed corporations 
to form separate entities called political action committees. 
They were legally separate but they could be funded by the 
firms, and they were basically run by the firms. As part of 
the deal, they were required to report all of their contribu-
tions, and the government made these contributions pub-
lic. You could purchase, in those days they were tapes, 
where you could find all of the contributions made by the 
political action committees, including labor unions and 
other kinds of groups, as well as corporations. I started 
thinking: there’s got to be a way that I can use these polit-
ical contributions as an outcome of interlock ties. 
The problem was that interlocks were by definition rela-
tional. They involve relations between firms. If you are 
talking about class cohesion or business unity, you’re talk-
ing about a relational process. But the contributions are 
made by individual firms, so if you want to talk about con-
tribution patterns, your unit of analysis is the individual 
company. I was trying to figure out how I could develop a 
relational analysis using these campaign contributions. One 
day it hit me: I could look at dyads, pairs of companies. If 
you look at a pair of companies, you can ask the question: 
if these companies share an interlock, are they more likely 
to contribute to the same candidates? 
The other thing is that I wasn’t just interested in network 
ties as social connections. I wanted to argue that there was 
a more structural basis for firms to be cohesive with one 
another, that it wasn’t based just on personal friendship. 
The idea I came up with was that the firms’ economic 
interdependence made them more cohesive. It turned out 
that there was a body of scholarship on this in sociology, 
called power-dependence theory, the classic article was by 
Richard Emerson, and this even goes back to Durkheim, 
because in The Division of labor Durkheim argued that 
interdependence was the basis of organic solidarity. Emer-
son made a similar argument, that when people are de-
pendent on one another, they gain a stake in maintaining 
the relationship. If companies are interdependent, then 
they would probably have a stake in maintaining a cohe-
sive relationship as well. The problem was, there was no 
publicly available data on direct transactions between 
companies. But around that time I had come across Ron 
Burt’s early work. He dealt with the problem by looking at 
relations among industries, because those data are availa-
ble in the US. Ron had used these input-output tables to 
predict where interlocks were likely to occur. I wanted to 
use these tables to predict where firms would exhibit simi-
lar political behavior. 
3 After the 1992 book, you seemed to 
get into another main interest: the 
problem of the relationship between 
the state and the economy wasn’t so 
central to you anymore. You decided to 
turn to other questions, such as the role 
of banks in the intercorporate network. 
Why did you move in this direction? 
By the time my 1992 book came out, sociologists, at least 
in the US, had lost interest in questions about class and 
power, about the relations between business and the 
state. What was left of the area was now dominated by 
state-centered theories. There was no real interest in look-
ing at questions like the effect of business on the political 
process. And this was related to a lack of interest in class, 
at least in the US. There was much more of a focus on race 
and gender inequality. 
Meanwhile, although my own work was becoming much 
more rigorous, my focus was getting more and more nar-
row. It was almost as if I was saying: well, I’ll do these very 
well crafted and very rigorous articles, I’ll get tenure, and 
then I’ll go back to working on the big questions. Except 
that one day I realized that this was the only thing I knew 
how to do anymore, the kind of articles that end up in the 
American sociological review or Administrative science 
quarterly. It’s a good way to advance your career, but it 
moves you away from the big questions. And there wasn’t 
as much interest in those questions anyway. 
What interest there was in these questions was coming 
from people in business schools, who were discovering 
social network analysis. They were saying: “You can look 
at these network ties and they will explain firm behavior!” 
Jerry Davis, who is now my colleague, was a graduate 
student at Stanford, and he was writing his paper on how 
interlock ties led to the diffusion of takeover defense plans 
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among American corporations. Another graduate student, 
from Carnegie Mellon, Pam Haunschild, wrote a paper 
showing that companies whose CEOs sat on the boards of 
companies that had recently made acquisitions were more 
likely to make acquisitions themselves. Because of this 
work, interlocks came to be a big deal among people in 
business schools. Sociologists weren’t interested anymore, 
but the business school people were. I had shown that 
connections among firms affected the firms’ political be-
havior, so I wondered if they affected their economic be-
havior as well. 
In the mid-1980s I had begun a project with Linda Stearns, 
whom I had known in graduate school. My dissertation 
focused on changes in network structures over time.  Linda 
had worked on capital dependence among firms over time, 
and it occurred to me that we should put the two togeth-
er. We had started by looking at the relations between 
financial dependence and interlocks. After my book came 
out, we wondered if maybe interlocks could predict firm 
financial behavior: if your company and my company have 
an interlock, maybe we influence each other about how 
we structure our financial portfolio, how much debt we 
use and how much equity. If we could show something 
like that, that even these economic and financial variables 
could be predicted by social ties, this would really show the 
value of economic sociology. We started to do that and we 
had some success. 
In the 1990s, the chief executive of one the largest US 
banks was someone who had a big interest in social sci-
ence, and he set up a research foundation, funded by the 
bank. The foundation put out a request for proposals, with 
the idea that you could get access to the bank and study it. 
Linda and I decided that this was too good an opportunity 
to pass up, and we were able to get one of these grants. 
We were interested in the question of risk, how it could be 
mitigated by social network ties. When we looked at how 
the bank operated, we started to talk with corporate 
bankers, the people who actually made deals with corpora-
tions, and we discovered that they had to use social net-
works inside the organization in order to get their deals 
closed. We ended up doing a study in which we inter-
viewed individual bankers. We got information about the 
structure of their networks, and we were able to show that 
the likelihood of them successfully closing a deal was a 
function of how sparse their networks were. You need to 
pull people together to approve your deal, and the more 
diverse your network is, the greater the probability you 
close the deal. This was consistent with Ron Burt’s argu-
ment about structural holes, that a sparse network gives 
you more resources and information. We published a cou-
ple of articles from this study and they received a certain 
amount of attention, but it was a long way from the early 
questions about class and power from which I started. But 
this is about the time I started thinking about the questions 
that frame my new book. 
4 It seems that in your most recent book 
you came back to these big questions 
you were interested in at the beginning 
of your career… Could you tell us a little 
bit more about the way you came back 
to these questions? 
During this period – this is the 1990s and maybe the early 
2000s – I was still on this path of producing these very 
well-crafted, rigorous studies, with a very clear and possi-
bly narrow focus. They weren’t narrow by conventional 
American sociological standards, they were pretty main-
stream, but they were narrow compared to the questions 
with which I originally started. I had applied for another 
grant from the National Science Foundation. It was a tight, 
solid proposal. One of the reviewers wrote: “this is a good 
proposal, we should fund it, there is nothing wrong with 
it”. Then the reviewer started criticizing me, saying: “this 
principal investigator is a full professor, and this is the kind 
of project an assistant professor should do,” that when 
you’re a full professor you should be thinking about 
broader topics, and doing bigger things, and taking risks. 
And that hurt, because I knew the reviewer was right. 
During these years, I had this nagging feeling in the back 
of my mind: am I really asking the big questions? I even 
wrote something in the conclusion of my 1992 book 
where I said that some critics might accuse me of ducking 
the big questions in this book, but I plead innocent, be-
cause I really was dealing with them, except that I’m not 
sure that I was. I had been thinking for a few years that I 
needed to do something that’s really exciting. 
For a long time, I had this idea that the American business 
community had developed a sort of false consciousness, in 
the Marxist sense that they did not operate in their own 
interest. If you take for example healthcare policy, unlike 
virtually the entire rest of the developed world, there was 
no national healthcare program in the US, except for the 
elderly. Private businesses had basically taken on the re-
sponsibility of providing healthcare for their employees. In 
the 1950s, when healthcare did not cost very much, it was 
not so much of a problem. But by the 1990s, healthcare 
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costs were skyrocketing, and it was putting a huge burden 
on private companies. They were aware of this, and they 
started saying that maybe we need something like a na-
tional policy. When Bill Clinton got elected, one of the first 
things he did was to propose a national healthcare plan. 
Originally, the American companies were supportive of 
this. But there was too much division among them. The far 
right had by then basically captured the Republican Party. 
They were strongly against anything Bill Clinton wanted to 
do. Big business originally supported Clinton’s healthcare 
plan, but then they were frightened out of it by the Repub-
licans in Congress. 
The other thing that struck me was when I thought back 
to the way the corporate elite had been in the 1950s and 
the 1960s. I was a little too young for the anti-war move-
ment, if I had been two or three years older I might have 
been sent to Vietnam, but I was still very critical of the war.  
In college and graduate school we thought that these 
business guys were the bad guys, that they were the ones 
who got us into Vietnam, that they were behind all of the 
racism and imperialism and all the other terrible things that 
the United States did. When we were studying corporate 
interlocks in those days, we were studying those people 
we thought were the bad guys. And yet when you look 
back at that time, by comparison to the present these 
people were pretty liberal. As one of the reviewer of my 
book put it, Chrystia Freeland, the modal position of the 
big business people from that time would now put them 
on the left wing of the Democratic Party. I had a feeling 
that part of the problem that we have in American politics, 
where it seems impossible to accomplish anything, is that 
big business can’t even act in its own interest, to save the 
system from which they are benefiting. 
This, of course, is a pretty broad claim, and I had no idea 
how I was going to do this work: where are my regression 
equations, what is my dependent variable, where is the 
network, how am I going to measure this network? In-
stead, I wrote the book as a historical narrative.  I wouldn’t 
call it pure history. I did use some archival data, but I did 
not spend three years in the archives. I would call it analyt-
ical history, where I have a framework and I try to make 
sense of historical events. I don’t think there is a lot of 
controversy about the facts that I report. But I have my 
own interpretation. 
5 Could you tell us a little bit more 
about this argument? 
The argument is that in the period after WWII, the elite 
members of the American business community had a more 
far-sighted perspective. The term they used was enlight-
ened self-interest. There was an organization called the 
Committee for Economic Development – they still exist but 
they are just a shadow of their former self – they were very 
prominent at the time. They included CEOs of important 
companies as well as academics. Originally the group was 
formed in 1942 to deal with questions about what was 
going to happen to the economy after WWII. It turned out 
that they continued during the 50s and beyond, develop-
ing positions on various issues. They were behind the Mar-
shall Plan, for example, the Employment Act of 1946, a 
bunch of legislation. By contemporary standards they were 
pretty liberal. They represented only a small part of the 
American business community, but they were the segment 
people listened to because they were the biggest corpora-
tions. They made their peace with Keynesian economics, 
they decided that the public needed to have enough pur-
chasing power to sustain the economy, so they needed to 
have high wages and low unemployment. These people 
didn’t love labor unions, no business people do, but they 
accepted them. They worked to find some kind of accom-
modation, which became known as the postwar capital-
labor accord. Some recent labor historians are now criticiz-
ing this idea, they say that there never was an accord, but I 
think they miss the point. Yes, business was always 
fighting labor, tooth and nail, but during that period there 
was what Ralf Dahrendorf called institutionalized class 
conflict. They were fighting, but they were not really trying 
to destroy the unions in the way they would do later on. 
They were fighting in a regularized, institutionalized 
framework. 
The argument I make is that the large companies were 
constrained to adopt this moderate approach by three 
forces. One is that the state was highly legitimate at the 
time. The American public thought that the state was a 
force for good. This was a result of Franklin Roosevelt’s 
New Deal. Because of this, the government had a certain 
degree of power, and business could not, like they do 
today, blame the government for everything, they had to 
accept an active government. The second force was orga-
nized labor, which was relatively strong at the time, not as 
strong as the European unions, but certainly much strong-
er than they are now. At a certain point in the 50s, 35% of 
the US labor force was unionized, which is a pretty high 
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percentage. And then the third factor, I argue, was the 
financial community. It is not that the banks controlled 
corporations, but the banks served as a consensus builder. 
If you look at the boards of directors of the big banks, they 
included what an old graduate school pal of mine, Jim 
Bearden, called the corporate all-stars. You could see the 
CEOs of a lot of major companies sitting on the boards of 
the big banks. Through these connections they forged a 
certain normative consensus. Sitting on a board and inter-
acting with people from other industries created a broader 
view of the world, which tended to create a more moder-
ate view as well, because you see the world from different 
perspectives. This was the third force that helped the busi-
ness community to be more cohesive. 
This system worked pretty well through the 50s and 60s. 
There was a lot of turmoil of course in the US, it is not like 
it was a completely stable and happy period, but the econ-
omy was booming, and the average real standard of living 
for an American family doubled between 1946 and 1970. 
The political system also worked in a way that it doesn’t 
work now: members of different political parties made 
deals, they accomplished things, the party that was out of 
power cooperated with the ruling party. The system 
worked pretty well. 
And then in the 1970s it all began to fall apart. There were 
a series of forces. The rest of the world had recovered from 
WWII, Japan, much of Europe, and particularly Germany. 
They started flooding the American market with manufac-
tured goods, which American consumers discovered were 
higher quality. American consumers started buy non-US 
cars. The big American companies had gotten soft because 
they had been in these highly concentrated markets where 
they did not face competition, which meant they did not 
have to innovate. In the 1970s they were now facing com-
petition, and they were completely unprepared for it. So 
they started to experience a crisis. There was an inflation-
ary pressure in the economy. There was the energy crisis of 
1973. The major institutions also began to experience a 
major crisis of legitimacy. As a result of the 1960s, Ameri-
cans began to dislike the government, but they began to 
dislike business as well. The heads of big corporations saw 
themselves as under siege. In order to deal with it they 
reorganized politically, but this time they allied themselves 
with the traditional conservatives. Where earlier they had 
not wanted anything to do with these people, now they 
decided to become allies. Meanwhile Keynesian economics 
was not working any more. We had high inflation and 
high unemployment simultaneously. 
What happened in the 1970s is that the corporate elite, 
aligned with the traditional conservatives, started to push 
back against the forces that had constrained it. They be-
came very aggressive in fighting against government regu-
lation. They became very aggressive going after labor un-
ions. By the time Ronald Reagan was elected, they had 
basically won. Labor was much weaker, business had 
stopped a series of progressive bills in Congress, and they 
had raised the question of whether the real problem of the 
American economy was insufficient supply, and insufficient 
productivity, rather than insufficient demand. 
6 So basically they won, in quite a short 
period of time. And one of the 
paradoxes of your argument is to say 
that once they won, then they became 
weaker. 
That’s a paradox, but I have to be careful: it’s not that they 
became weaker, it’s that they became ineffective on issues 
that required collective action. They had always been rela-
tively unified at the top. In the 1970s, business as a whole 
became unified. And by the 1980s, having won the war, 
having thrown off the basic sources of constraint, they no 
longer needed to be unified. It’s Simmel’s old external 
threat-internal cohesion argument: you get rid of the ex-
ternal threat, there is no need to be cohesive anymore. 
They got everything they wanted, so they started to push 
for their own interests. You start to see this in the 1980s, 
and you see it clearly in the 1986 tax reform. It is widely 
believed by many commentators that business lost in the 
1986 tax reform.  Some people said, I quote them in the 
book, that business could have won if they would have 
fought collectively, but they were too busy fighting for 
themselves. 
There are two other things that happened in the 1980s 
that were very important. First, the last source of cohesion 
among the corporate elite, the banks, fell out of the center 
of the network. There was a whole series of factors that 
led to this. They started experiencing economic difficulty 
because people found alternative ways to use their money, 
in mutual funds and money market funds, for example. 
Companies found alternative ways to finance themselves.  
They used commercial paper instead of borrowing from 
banks. The banks were weakened by this, so they started 
to act like investment banks, moving away from lending 
and toward fee-for-service activities. What’s interesting 
about this process is that you started to see these non-
financial CEOs dropping off the boards of the banks. So 
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the banks, for the first time in the history of interlocks 
going back to the 1870s, started to fall out of the center 
of the network. The second thing was in the mid-1980s 
there was an unprecedented acquisition wave, with a large 
number of hostile takeovers. Managers saw themselves as 
under siege. They were in a very precarious position. In the 
1950s, if you were a corporate president, you could sit back 
and think about the long term implications of your actions 
for the system. But in the 1980s, you could be out of work 
next month, because the company could be taken over, so 
you became much more focused on short term issues. You 
can see a drop in CEO tenure during this period. 
Because of these changes that occurred in the 1980s, the 
elite became fragmented. When they need to act collec-
tively, to deal with issues like healthcare, or the deficit, or 
taxation, recent events have shown that they are incapable 
of doing this, even for situations where it would be in their 
interest. They have completely lost control of the Republi-
can Party. When the shutdown occurred, they said “this is 
crazy, you cannot do this,” but the Republicans basically 
said to big business “screw you, we don’t care.” That would 
never have happened in the 1950s or 1960s. At an individu-
al level, these companies are very powerful. They can get a 
lot of favors, they lobby people in Congress, they get good 
deals for themselves. But for anything that requires them to 
act collectively, they are completely ineffectual. 
 
